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. On the other hand, risk assessment is defined as the process used to determine risk management priorities by evaluating and comparing levels of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other criteria, as described by the same reference. Earlier, published research concentrated on conducting risk analysis for piping systems in the oil and gas distribution networks.
However, studies in the water industry concentrated mainly on conducting such analyses in a qualitative approach.
The reliability of any water distribution network may be conducted through qualitative and quantitative risk analysis and assessment of impact generating events. In recent years, piping reliability analysis used several methods to generate information about piping service data. Those may be summarized in the following points: † analytical methods such as probabilistic fractures, † expert judgment, † statistical analysis of piping history data, † combined methods of the above.
Recent advances in the statistical analysis of actual measurements made it possible to study this subject thoroughly. Thomas (1981) used the combined approach of these methods to address the reliability of pipes in nuclear reactors. Lydell (2000) revisited Thomas's work and used statistical methods to generate long-term analysis of the pipes' ages under different fatigue causes and criteria. He demonstrated that the actual measurements show that the rate of failure of the pipe due to rupture and leak is dependent on time and diameter. He used a time reference of 10 years and determined that the larger the pipe diameter the lower the rate of frequency of rupture. (It is the opposite case for times above the 10 years reference.) That rate of rupture frequency tends to become constant and stay that way for all types of pipe diameters at an age of around 12-14 years.
In general, looped networks have a higher reliability over branched line systems. Kansal et al. (1995) used a probability approach to investigate the reliability of networks according to this principle. The reliability of large networks was investigated by Tanyimboh et al. (1999) under cases of component failure and growing demands, and by Xu & Goulter (1998) using probability distribution functions of nodal demands, pipe roughness and reservoir/tank levels.
Break rates in a given system can fluctuate by a factor of ten from one year to the next, so an average of the previous several years is the most reliable indication of the current break rate upon which to base estimates of future break rates. Discussing breaks in terms of total breaks in a system can be somewhat misleading, since the number of breaks will depend on the size of the system and the time period under consideration. Determining the rate of change of the break rate involves extrapolating trends in the break rate. Shamir & Howard (1979) proposed an exponential equation relating pipe break rates at some year to a base break rate at some starting base year. Kleiner et al. (2001) studied the problem of pipe deterioration in networks due to breakages.
Using the Shamir and Howard pipe break exponential formula, they implemented an economical optimization approach to making decisions on the rehabilitation of water networks. Through developing a pipe cost function, they managed to give an economically efficient computation on when it becomes justified to replace pipes in any given network versus repairing them. However, their analysis was limited to small networks of up to 15-20 pipe links.
For any given set of circumstances, the level of risk may be calculated as the multiplication of the probability of an event or adverse outcome (chance/likelihood/frequency, expressed numerically as occurrences per unit time) and a measure of the consequences of that event (damage/ detriment/severity, expressed as a specific value measure). This will generate qualitative levels of risk, accordingly. This is true for any network risk analysis. It has to be stressed that the above definition is not sufficient in itself to fully describe the real risk of real situations. However, for a given situation in which the terms may be specified with reasonable accuracy, it provides an adequate basis for comparing risks or making resource decisions, as was described by Helm (1996) . Another study by Basson et al. (1994) introduced the time factor, by the recurrence interval of failure, which is the reciprocal of the annual risk of failure. Some definitions of the risk of failure of the supply of water resource system are also described and its relation to the reliability criterion.
It is generally accepted that, when analyzing water networks under damaged situations, the problem arising from eliminating negative (gauge) pressures appears during the iterative procedure. Some of those analyses are based on artificial damage scenarios simulating the probability of occurrence of damage in each pipe segment. Pressuredriven simulations of the effects of failure of major system components were made by Tanyimboh et al. (1999) . One common indicator of the deterioration of water distribution systems is the number of water mains breaks. Saegrov et al.
(1999) discussed effective methods of the managerial rehabilitation of water systems. They indicated the effect of climate changes on the rate of pipe bursts and reported that the average lifetime of water mains in fully developed networks lies in the range from 100 -200 years.
The research survey shows a need to identify the base components of factors determining risk levels in networks.
This should be based on trends in break rates, as this provides useful information on the causes of breaks and their possible related remedial actions. Data collected for water main bursts and breaks are especially useful in identifying broader trends in water mains deterioration. In recent years, the advancement in computational facilities made it possible to generate complex analyses for large systems. Risk analysis falls into such a category, and applying that to water distribution networks is no exception. Earlier, only qualitative approaches could be made.
Recently, more and more analyses are becoming quantitative in nature, where measures and comparisons can be made to such large systems, and in all different operational states. The present study will try to establish and calculate the risk levels for water distribution networks under normal operation and make those values a reference for subsequent system states to be compared with. This will generate a way to enhance the decision-making process of which system state to choose from in the process of designing and/or rehabilitating the water distribution networks. Such an analysis requires that a mathematical measuring formula be established for calculating the various levels of risk. Such a formula will be based on the aforementioned Shamir and Howard empirical pipes' break rates (Shamir & Howard of networks to meet predetermined water demand levels.
Quantitative risk assessment combines three key ideas:
1. the chance of something going wrong, 2. the consequences if it does and 3. the context within which the situation is set.
In symbolic terms, the following equation for estimating levels of risk of an event can be written:
Since the objective is to establish the total risk values for a water network under a specific operational state, therefore, definitions should be given for the total probability of collective risk-causing events and the total consequences resulting from those. Those definitions were found to be convenient for this study, although variations may be made in this respect, and as appropriate.
The probability of an event is an indication of how frequent that that event occurs. It can either be found through actual statistical data, or be calculated from a suitable simulation process. It can be represented by a numerical value, customarily between 0 and 1, inclusive (0 being an impossible event and 1 for a definitely occurring event). The above principle can be applied to water distribution networks by calculating the resulting probability of a network undergoing probable occurrences of failure in some of its components over a specific period of
time. An effort is made here to simulate, as accurately as possible, the trend of failure in network components.
Taking, for example, the failure rates of pipe segments (due to breakage, leaks and scheduled maintenance), it can be said that the probability of failure of a specific pipe in a network is a time-dependent criterion, being at its lower value when the pipe is new and deteriorating with time to a higher value at which point the pipe is considered irreparable and should be replaced. If it is assumed that a pipe segment has the probability trend described above, then its probability function can be simulated by the curve shown in Figure 1 . Figure 1 represents the probability of failure for one pipe in a network, where the damage effect is assumed to last only for a specific period of time and the pipe is repaired by the end of that period. A suitable formula will be used here to simulate the trend shown in the above curve. The same formula will be applied to each and every pipe segment of the water network under discussion. All resulting failure events are considered "independent" (i.e. a failure event happening for any pipe has no effect in changing the probability of failure for the other pipes). Therefore, the total probability of failure for all mutually exclusive pipe failure events at any one time can be calculated by
The index i here represents the index of all pipes in the network. Since probability values are figures less than 1, therefore, P tot will have a value much lower than each of the individual probability figures involved, which is reasonable since the probability of some two events happening at the same time is definitely lower than the probability of each of If it is assumed that such an objective represents the ultimate case where the network is in its fully operational water delivery state, then any reduction in that water delivery level, due to some piping failure event, can be counted as a measure of the damaging consequence of that event.
To put it in a mathematical form, the following equation can be written:
The reduction in water delivered to customers is actually the difference between the total demand requested and the actual water quantities delivered. Therefore, the consequences of any failure related event would be calculated from Equations (1), (2) and (3a) were used to generate the risk levels presented in this paper. A typical reference network is used in the current analysis, the proposed connectivity of which is shown in Figure 2 .
THEORETICAL MODELING OF NETWORK RISK RATES USING PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
It is the objective of this section to link the probability of the breaking rates for pipes established from some empirical trends to the principles of risk estimation mentioned earlier.
This will theoretically predict and model the variations of risk levels over time due to pipe breaking events. In doing so, some assumptions are made which are as reasonable as possible to keep the model simple yet realistic and, most importantly, reliable in giving the predicted risk values for specific segments of water networks.
In their research work, Shamir & Howard (1979) proposed an empirical formula to calculate future expected yearly rates of breaking occasions for pipe segments of networks based on actual yearly measurements of the breakage rates for pipes. Their proposed formula may be written as
For presentation purposes and after a suitable selective choice of constants, the above equation would give a variation trend with changing time similar to the curve shown in Figure 3 , which shows that the break rate N increases exponentially with time t as the pipe gets older.
Such a trend is almost never allowed to go to infinity in actual operational networks since at some stage in time a decision has to be made to replace that specific pipe either partially or completely by a suitable new one as it seems, from a logical point of view, that this increase in breaking rate is one of the factors giving rise to risk levels for that particular pipe segment and for the water network as a whole.
At once it can be seen that, following the Shamir and Howard equation mentioned earlier, the probability of the breaking of a pipe in a network varies with time and has some reliance relation with the value of breaking rate per year, N. As it seems, there is a direct link between this breaking rate increase and the increase in the probability of pipe breakages with time. As defined, the probability is However, it was found that the easiest and most direct way of mathematically modeling this is to normalize N values between the lowest and highest expected values, as is explained below. Upon assuming that N varies between its value at t 0 (the starting time) and t s (the expected life span of the pipe), the following normalizing factor may be written: . This definition will be used to estimate the consequences of pipe breakage events.
FUNDAMENTAL NETWORK COMPONENTS SCENARIOS
Partial segments of network components will be isolated and investigated following the above mathematical and probability analysis. Several design criteria will be used to show the effect of changing network component design on risk factors and the network performance in general. Three network piping combinations have been selected, namely: † the star connection, † the delta connection and † the modified delta connection.
All these connections share that they are composed of multiple pipe segments joined together. However, they differ in the way they function, and therefore each will have different characteristic performances which contribute to the total operation of the network, and therefore it is expected that the three scenario connections will have the same risk variation trends with time. However, they are expected to differ in risk value levels, as will be seen later. Those three connection variations will be analyzed and explained comprehensively below.
The star connection is generated in network design reduce the water delivered to node A by one quarter. † Assumption model B states that breaking of one pipe will not have any effect on water delivery, whereas two broken pipes will result in a one-third reduction and three broken pipes will result in a two-thirds reduction. † Assumption model C states that breaking of any one or even two pipes will have no effect, while three broken pipes will result in a one-half reduction in the water delivered to point A.
Logically speaking, assumption model A will somehow have higher risk levels than the other scenarios, and a reduction in risk values results when changing the design from A to B or C. Using those scenario assumptions with the probability table, the following Table 2 for the three models is produced.
Based on the tables, those three scenarios can be drawn as three probability distribution curves, as shown in Figure 6 . Table 1 for the star connection categorized for each of the three assumption models. This will result in the values listed in Table 3 . Figure 5 A last word can be said that similar trends are seen but in a somewhat more complex form when generating the hydrodynamic solution of actual networks, as will be seen later in the next chapter.
Risk values can be calculated for the star connection from the two tables (1 and 3) by multiplying the values of
Another variation of network connectivity is the delta connection, as shown in Figure 10 . The delta connection is generated in network design from the intersection of three pipes (P 2 , P 3 and P 4 ), joined together and connected to a source through pipe P 1 to form a network segment that delivers water through a loop formation.
From such a connection of pipes, it is concluded that the four-pipe network combination delivers a net water flowrate to nodes A, B and C at an assumed total rate of d, and that a breaking situation in any of those pipes will have some direct effect on the capability of this network segment to deliver the quantity of water flowrate requested at node A, B and C. Furthermore, each node is assumed to request one-third of the total demand delivered, (i.e. d/3). For such a network connection segment, and at any one time, there are several possibilities for the breaking of the four pipes. As was explained earlier for the star connection, there are theoretically sixteen different possibilities here, tabulated in Table 4 .
Such breaking scenarios will have a direct effect on the delivered flowrate to points A, B and C. Based on such configurations and according to the possibilities tabulated above, Table 5 high values for risk at the early stages of the simulation time compared with the rest of the curves. This high-value line is a direct effect of the vulnerability of the network segment represented by pipe 1 (see Figure 10 ). This pipe is the only supplier to the whole delta connection from the source S and therefore any fracture or break that may happen to this pipe, especially at the early stages, makes this network segment loose function and the consequences will be very high. For this reason, it can be said that the risk levels are, to some extent, an indication of the nature of the quality of the network design, and calculating it from the early stages of preparing the blueprints is essential. To prove this point further, a slight modification to the delta design is conducted, as is explained in the next section.
The proposal for a modified delta connection is generated in the network design by supplying each nodal demand with several lines of water delivery in a looping design system that will eventually reduce the risks involved in the operation and maintenance of the water network.
This looping is already used in actual water networks and in similar electrical wiring systems as well. This ensures the provision of more reliable working conditions for any design. However, how much looping is needed is not known unless comparative studies are conducted to investigate the effect of adding additional components to the network itself, and whether that will be economically justifiable or not.
In order to remedy the branching design of the delta connection from one source S 1 , a new modified design is proposed here. This is shown in Figure 12 , where another pipe P 2 is added. This new pipe is connected to another source S 2 (or even the same source for that matter) to ensure that the delta connection is supplied with water by two sources, as shown in the figure. The objective here is to prove that a reduction in the risk levels is accomplished by this modification, especially in the early stages of the simulation process.
From such a connection of pipes, it is concluded that the five-pipe network combination delivers a net water flowrate to nodes A, B and C at an assumed rate of d and that a breaking situation in any of those pipes will have some direct effect on the capability of this network segment to deliver the quantity of water flowrate requested at nodes A, B and C. Furthermore, each node is assumed to request one-third of the total demand requested (i.e. d/3). Since Table 5 | Consequence values calculated for each breakage possibility mentioned in Table 4 for the delta connection shown in Figure 10 Possibility there are now five pipes involved, for such a network connection segment, and at any one time, there are thirty two possibilities for the breaking of the five pipes. These possibilities are tabulated in Table 6 .
Since for this modified delta connection design, two sources of supplied water are provided, the hydrodynamic performance is therefore enhanced to the extent that any one nodal demand will have different paths for water supply, and hence lower restrictions are imposed when assuming the hydrodynamic effects and their consequences.
However, the following are directly concluded from the figure: † Simultaneous breaking of pipes P 1 and P 2 will shut down water delivery totally since they are connected to the two sources. † Simultaneous breaking of pipes P 4 and P 5 will shut down point C, as seen from the figure.
Based on such configurations, and according to the possibilities tabulated above, Table 7 lists the analytical consequences of the thirty two possibilities.
The results of calculating the risk levels for such a delta connection are represented by Figure 13 . This figure shows a substantial decrease in the rate of change of the risk levels.
Compared with the original delta curves of Figure 11 , it shows the diminishing situations of possible risky operational points, especially in the early stages of the simulation time. This is a good indication of the enhancement and reliability of the looping system when incorporated in the design of water distribution networks and its Figure 12 and their respective probabilities according to Equation (5b 
COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS
The simulation technique for calculating risk levels for a water distribution network relies on a technique developed for this purpose. It uses extended period analysis in that it requires updating the system parameters at every time step.
Different random failure functions are assigned to each pipe segment and the resulting reduction in water delivery (if any) is calculated using a marching technique as shown by the structured computer code in Figure 14 .
The resulting values of risk levels will be dependent upon the accompanied time values and they will be calculated for a dimensionless period of time set in advance.
As the figure shows, for each time step a calculation loop is conducted. This loop will include calculating the total probability of all randomized failures for the piping network that were inflicted automatically on each pipe segment of the designated network, according to the distribution shown in Figure 1 . This stage will result in the generation of the total probability of occurrence of all failures. The next stage is that the network is solved with those inflicted pipe failures. Estimation of the hydrodynamic quantities will be generated at this stage and an actual distribution of the calculated demand that was met will be developed, thus paving the way to calculating the consequences resulting from the pipe failure for the network as a whole. Those Table 6 for the modified delta connection shown in Figure 12 Possibility no. Consequence consequences are calculated next and according to Equation (3a) . The risk level for that time step is calculated next and the time loop is incremented for the next loop step.
A table results from these calculations giving the variation of risk level values of that particular network with time.
RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS
The procedures and techniques used to obtain the results of the risk analysis relied on a Cþþ software program designed for this purpose. The network that is chosen for this purpose is shown in Figure 2 . The risk analysis is based on successive computation of steady states having different damage conditions. To give a better view of the computational procedures, let us assume that for the network in Figure 2 , pipes 3 and 4 are temporarily damaged and isolated, i.e. they are out of service. Then, the steady state solution can be generated to have the hydrodynamic profile shown in Figure   15 , which shows that demand at node 3 is not met. The other nodes are receiving their normal share of water as in normal steady state operation. However, it should also be noted that the total system has a different pipe flowrate distribution and a different pressure profile, as indicated by the change in coloring of the pipes involved. For such an event, the probability of the simultaneous occurrence of two damaged pipes can be calculated using Equation (2) by multiplying together the probability for each pipe if they are assumed mutually exclusive events, i.e. each pipe damage occurs irrespective of the other. On the other hand, Equation (3a) is used to calculate the consequence resulting from the reduction in demand involved. Multiplying those two calculated figures, as in Equation (1), will give the level of risk (risk index) for that specific event of two damaged pipes.
The same can be repeated day after day of network operation, after assuming that any damage lasts for one day only and is repaired by the end of each day.
By following the above technique, risk levels can be obtained for a long period of time. That period, when normalized, is taken in this study as unity of operation, which means that it can be applied to any period. The reason for this selection is that the intention is to concentrate on the variation of risk over time and to take all other values with respect to that, to keep the analysis as general as possible. The damage is separately calculated for each pipe through a function having a random distribution, similar to that shown in Figure 1 .
A typical run for such a function is shown in Figure 16 , where it may be seen that a total damage of 100% will be exerted on each pipe. The whole computation process took about 6 hours to conclude and the resulting risk levels generated using Equations (1), (3a) and (5b) As a conclusion, it is believed that the more the number of pattern curves a network reflects in the total risk calculations, the better is its looping design structure capability in meeting demand requirements even under a indicating that risk values are increasing with the increasing frequency of pipe damage events with time. However, the results also showed that, depending on the design, some pipe bursts have no effect in depriving demand-nodal-points from delivered water, except for changing the flowrate distribution across the whole network. As a consequence, it is believed that the greater the number of pattern curves a network reflects in the total risk calculations, the better is its looping design structure capability in meeting demand requirements even under burst pipe situations. All trend characteristic curves resulting from the simulations were seen to follow the Shamir and Howard empirical formula (Shamir & Howard 1979 ) with an exponential increase in risk values with time. Support for damage and risk analyses is recommended in any designed water distribution network analysis package. Results from the theoretical simulation extracted for each of the specific damage scenarios in the risk analysis were greatly enhanced by the visualization styles adopted.
